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THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION’S BID TO TRANSFORM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
David Ward* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This Comment has two principle aims. First, it will argue that the 
core doctrines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) rest on 
a problematic legal basis; specifically, that these doctrines contradict 
well-established human rights norms that SCO members themselves 
endorsed by treaty. Such norms include non-refoulement (which 
prohibits the return of refugees to countries where their life or freedom 
would be threatened), prohibitions against torture and genocide, and the 
universally accepted right to self-determination with its attendant 
political, religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural freedoms.  
Second, through case studies, this Comment will illustrate the 
practical results of these SCO doctrines as applied by SCO members. 
The Comment suggests that the continued application of these doctrines, 
combined with SCO’s imminent expansion, will transform international 
and human rights law into a more authoritarian-friendly regime marked 
less by the rule of law than by the will of state leaders. 
The remainder of this Comment is organized as follows. Part I uses 
the 2005 Andijan Massacre as a case study to introduce the way in which 
SCO members rely on SCO doctrines and obligations to override 
fundamental international laws. This case provides a context to 
understand the practical implications and consequences of the legal 
doctrines that are analyzed in detail in Part III. Part II presents a brief 
overview of SCO’s background, including its primary objective, origins 
and impetus, and imminent expansion. Part III analyzes the problematic 
legal basis of SCO’s core doctrines, including the “Three Evils” 
doctrine, the “Concept of Cooperation,” its secretive blacklist and 
information-sharing practices, and the principle of “non-interference in 
internal affairs.” Part IV moves beyond theory to illustrate through three 
case studies the actual ways in which SCO’s core doctrines come into 
conflict with its members’ international legal obligations. Between the 
three case studies in Part IV and the one in Part I, all six SCO members 
are included, giving a representative view of the application and impact 
of SCO’s core doctrines and policies. Part V states a brief conclusion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The 2005 Andijan Massacre 
 
In the early morning of May 13, 2005, a band of unidentified men 
rushed the Andijan Prison in Uzbekistan, freeing twenty-three local 
businessmen who were awaiting the verdict of their three-month trial for 
“extremism, fundamentalism, and separatism.”1 As word of the jailbreak 
spread, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people gathered in Andijan’s 
Babur Square to air grievances ranging from unemployment to the 
injustice of the businessmen’s trial.2 Uzbek security forces clamped 
down, and by the end of the next day, approximately 300 to 500 people 
had been killed.3 
Uzbek forces arrested and tortured hundreds, 4  but roughly 500 
people made it thirty kilometers to the Karadarya River where they 
crossed into Kyrgyzstan as refugees.5 Under international law, those 
refugees had a right to asylum.6 In addition, Kyrgyzstan’s own law on 
refugees expressly prohibits refoulement.7 Furthermore, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan specifically asked Kyrgyzstan not to repatriate 
Uzbeks seeking asylum, stating, “The principle of non-refoulement . . . is 
absolute and may not be derogated or circumvented through any other 
undertaking, be that bilateral treaty or any other arrangement.”8 
However, as members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had just signed the 2005 Astana 
Declaration, which requires SCO members to not only deny asylum to, 
																																								 																					
1  OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR 
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE [OSCE], PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE EVENTS IN 
ANDIJAN, UZBEKISTAN, 13 MAY 2005 6 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE ANDIJAN REPORT]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), KAZAKHSTAN/KYRGYZSTAN: 
EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, PROTECTION DENIED TO ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
64 (2009) [hereinafter FIDH]. 
5 OSCE ANDIJAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
6 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Dec. 16, 1966, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter Refugee Convention] (stating “no Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”); see also Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention against 
Torture] (stating “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture”). 
7  Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on refugees, art. 11 (2002), available at 
www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4957 (“A person, having received a denial of granting refugee 
status in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, or a notice on the revocation of refugee status shall 
not, under any circumstances, be expelled to the country, where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, ethnic origin, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion or a country, where he might become a victim of torture or a subject 
to an inhuman treatment.”). 
8 Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Calls on Kyrgyzstan Authorities to 
Facilitate Evacuation of Uzbek Refugees, UN Press Release SG/SM/10020-Ref/1184 (July 28, 
2005). 
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but also extradite, those suspected of terrorism, extremism, or 
separatism.9 
Faced with the choice of either violating the principle of non-
refoulement, which some experts consider to be jus cogens,10 or ignoring 
the 2005 Astana Declaration and its SCO treaty obligations, Kyrgyzstan 
chose the former and sent five refugees back to Uzbekistan.11 
Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy General Prosecutor, Sumar Nasiza, 
acknowledged the difficulty of the decision, stating, “For these five 
Uzbeks I didn’t sleep for three nights: on the one hand there is the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on the other hand there is the 
Convention Against Torture.”12 He justified his decision to extradite, 
saying Uzbekistan had asked for the return of 129 refugees, and that the 
five who were extradited were criminals.13  Nasiza did not mention 
Kyrgyszstan’s own law against refoulement or its treaty obligations 
under both the Convention against Torture and the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees. Ultimately, he trusted in Uzbek guarantees that 
the refugees would not be tortured upon their return.14 They are all in 
prison, “alive and kicking,” he said. 15 “We haven’t lost any of them.”16  
Kyrgyzstan’s Vice-speaker of Parliament offered a different 
perspective: “[T]hose who fled Uzbekistan were begging that we didn’t 
give them back, because they would be tortured.”17 While it is unclear if 
those five individuals have been tortured, it is well-documented that 
Uzbekistan engages in torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,” all of which violate the Convention against 
Torture.18 As such, Kyrgyzstan’s deportation, which its SCO obligations 
not only made possible but required, was a blatant violation of the well-
established international law of non-refoulement. 
 
II. SCO BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Goal of a New International Order 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s refoulement of five Uzbek nationals following the 
2005 Andijan Massacre may seem to be a minor incident. However, it 
exemplifies how SCO’s policies and practices subvert and even supplant 
																																								 																					
9 Declaration by the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (June 5, 2005), 
available at 
http://kazakhstanun.org/documents/undocuments/SCO%20Declaration%20(Eng%2019.07.05).doc. 
10 See, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (January 26, 2007); see also Jean Allain, The Jus 
Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533 (2001). 
11 FIDH, supra note 4, at 63. 
12 Id. at 74. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UZBEKISTAN 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 3–5 (2013). 
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many of the conventions, customary laws, general principles, and expert 
opinions that constitute international law.19  
As the organization expands and matures, its treaty obligations, 
practices, and values will increasingly constitute the new norm. This is a 
primary objective of SCO, as stated in Article 1 of its charter: “The main 
goals and tasks of SCO are: . . . promotion of a new democratic, fair and 
rational political and economic international order.”20  
In the words of Russian president Vladimir Putin, “With our 
combined efforts we will be able to bring the work of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation to a whole new level and achieve the 
ambitious goal of transforming our organisation into a foundational 
structure of the global economic and political architecture.”21 
 
B. Origins and Impetus 
 
Formed in 2001, SCO binds six states – China, Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – in a regional treaty designed to 
protect the states’ shared Central Asia borders from extremist, separatist, 
and terrorist forces.22 Except for Uzbekistan, each SCO member was 
party to the Shanghai Five, which was created in 1996 to resolve border 
disputes in the region and inject stability into a post-Cold War power 
vacuum.23 Each of the Shanghai Five, along with Uzbekistan, faced 
separatist threats 24  as well as the prospect of American-led NATO 
enlargement and intervention in their vicinity.25 These factors led to the 
creation of SCO.  
 
C. Imminent Expansion and Its Implications 
 
SCO’s ambitions, which are frequently echoed by officials of SCO 
nations,26 are vast but not farfetched. The sheer size of its collective 
population, landmass, GDP, political clout, and military power render its 
goals at least conceivable, if not likely.  
In September 2014, at SCO’s annual summit, members approved 
expansion of the organization, with India and Pakistan expected to join in 																																								 																					
19 UN Charter, art. 38. 
20 SCO Charter art. 1, available at http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69 (emphasis 
added). 
21 Press Release, The Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin Takes Part in an Expanded Meeting of the SCO Heads of Government 
(Nov. 7, 2011), http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/16987/print/. 
22 SCO Charter preamble, art. 1, available at http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69 
23 Alfred Gerstl, The China Factor in Regional Security Cooperation, 1 AUSTRIAN J. OF 
SOUTH-EAST ASIAN STUDIES, 118, 130 (2008). 
24 Mark N. Katz, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscow’s Lonely Road 
from Bishkek to Dushanbe, 32 ASIAN PERSP., 183, 187 (2008). 
25 Kajsa Ji Noe Oest & Peter Toft, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a Threat or 
Opportunity or Europe?, Institut for Statskundskab, Kobenhavns Universitet, 25–26, 33 (2007). 
26 See, e.g., Alexander Yakovenko, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Allies of a New 
Type, RT.COM (September 12, 2014), http://rt.com/op-edge/187360-sco-economic-humanitarian-
cooperation/ (stating, in the words of the Russian Ambassador to the UK, “SCO has become an 
influential organization and an important factor in the emergence of a new polycentric world order”; 
Yavokenko served as Deputy Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2011. Id.). 
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2015.27 A newly constituted eight-member SCO would represent more 
than 40 percent of the world’s population,28 one-quarter of its landmass,29 
and nearly 20 percent of global GDP.30 It would also possess two United 
Nations Security Council vetoes (Russia and China), four nuclear powers 
(Russia, China, India, and Pakistan), and three of the world’s four most 
powerful militaries (Russia, China, and India).31  
While any number of inter-member conflicts could hinder or derail 
the organization,32 such conflicts could be outweighed by a common 
commitment to authoritarian principles, 33  the threat of separatist 
groups,34 and a collective desire to reduce American and democratic 
influences in the world, specifically in Central Asia.35   
As Parts I, III, and IV indicate, “the new . . . political and economic 
international order”36 that the SCO seeks is authoritarian in nature. Those 
sections also illustrate that such a transformation of the current order is 
possible because SCO states view their SCO treaty obligations as 
paramount. Furthermore, since SCO represents an increasingly large 
segment of the international community,37 its doctrines, practices, and 
																																								 																					
27 Pax Sinica, China is trying to build a new world order, starting in Asia, THE ECONOMIST, 
(Sept. 20, 2014), available at http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21618866-china-trying-build-
new-world-order-starting-asia-pax-sinica. 
28 Marin Katusa, How Russia and Putin’s Alliances Will Challenge U.S. Hegemony, EQUITIES, 
(November 13, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://www.equities.com/editors-desk/economy-
markets/politics/how-russia-and-putins-alliances-will-challenge-us-hegemony. 
29  Countries of the World by Area, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/countries_by_area.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
30  GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
31  Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2014), GLOBAL FIREPOWER, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
32 E.g., border disputes between China and India, geopolitical political rivalries between Russia 
and China, conflicts between Pakistan and India, and competition for energy and other resources. 
33  As of 2014, SCO is comprised exclusively of authoritarian regimes. Undermining 
Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, FREEDOM HOUSE, June 2009, at 60 available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/undermining-democracy-21st-century-
authoritarians#.VQmdBY7WiYl. While India is the world’s largest democracy, it remains to be seen 
whether it will have any influence on SCO’s guiding principles once it joins. Arguably, the reverse is 
more likely. SCO’s principles have solidified over a decade and SCO expects new members to 
conform to these principles. Chinese foreign minister Cheng Guoping stated in May 2012 that states 
aspiring to SCO membership “must work hard towards political, legal and technical preparations for 
[membership].” Ananth Krishnan, Observer Countries ‘Must Work Hard’ for SCO Membership, 
THE HINDU (May 24, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/observer-countries-
must-work-hard-for-sco-membership-says-china/article3450358.ece.  
34 Katz, supra note 24. 
35 See Expert: Shanghai Group Expands Non-American World, SPUTNIKNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 
2014, 2:12 PM), http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20140910/192803481/Expert-Shanghai-Group-Expands-
Non-American-World.html; see also Andrew Scheineson, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(Backgrounder), THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883 (stating “SCO members are 
uneasy about certain U.S. policies, particularly its support of democratic reforms”). 
36 Press Release, supra note 21. 
37 In addition to India and Pakistan, current SCO observer states include Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Mongolia; dialogue partners include Belarus, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The United States’ 
2005 application to join SCO as an observer state was rejected. Ariel Cohen, What to Do about the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organizations Rising Influence, EURASIANET (Sept. 20, 2006 7:00 PM), 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml. 
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values also have the potential to alter customary law, which is, after all, 
comprised of the general practices that states accept as law.38 
Thus, the new authoritarian-friendly39 regime that the SCO envisions 
would erode the human rights that states, intergovernmental 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals have 
spent decades working to enshrine in international law.  
 
III. THE PROBLEMATIC LEGAL BASIS OF SCO’S CORE DOCTRINES 
 
A. The Broadly Defined “Three Evils” 
 
To understand SCO and its aims, it is necessary to understand the 
core doctrine that drives its policies and practices. Known as the “Three 
Evils,” this doctrine provides vast leeway for the aggressive prevention 
and prosecution of terrorism, separatism, and extremism by SCO’s 
member states. 
SCO defines each of the “Three Evils” differently than the UN and 
other international organizations. Under SCO, separatism is defined to 
include violent acts, or the planning or aiding of such acts, which are 
intended to violate the territorial integrity of a state. This includes the 
annexation of any part of a state’s territory or the disintegration of a 
state.40 Extremism is broadly defined to include violent acts intended to 
seize, keep power, or change the constitutional regime of a State, “as 
well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including 
organization, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and 
participation in them.” 41  Terrorism, under the 2009 SCO Counter-
Terrorism Convention, is vaguely defined as “an ideology of violence 
and [the] practice of attempting to influence the decisions of state 
authorities or international organisations by committing or threatening to 
commit violent or criminal acts intended to intimidate the population and 
cause damage to individuals, society and the state.”42  
The expansive language of these “definitions” begs further 
clarification, but none is provided. Thus, under the SCO regime, 
terrorism can be reduced to the mere threat of any criminal act intended 
to intimidate and cause some type of damage for the purpose of 
attempting to influence a state or international organization.  
Although the international community lacks a “universal and 
comprehensive” definition of terrorism, a consensus framework 																																								 																					
38  Customary Law, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/overview-customary-
law.htm. 
39 Authoritarian: 1. Favoring or enforcing strict obedience to authority, especially that of the 
government at the expense of personal freedoms. 1.1 Showing a lack of concern for the wishes or 
opinions of others; domineering; dictatorial. Authoritarian Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/authoritarian (last visited Nov. 
19, 2014). 
40 The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism art. 1, para. 
2, June 15, 2001. 
41 Id. at art. 1, para. 3. 
42  The Official Site of the President of Russia, Ratification of SCO Counter-Terrorism 
Convention (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.eng.kremlin.ru/news/1055. 
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nevertheless exists,43 and it is much stricter than SCO’s. Specifically, it 
insists that terrorist offenses should be limited to (a) acts that intend to 
cause at least “serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages” (b) “for 
the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or 
compelling a Government or international organization” (c) that fall 
within the scope and definition of international agreements pertaining to 
terrorism.44 In addition, consensus holds that “[i]t is essential . . . to 
ensure that the term ‘terrorism’ is confined in its use to conduct that is 
genuinely of a terrorist nature.”45 To that end, “it is important for States 
to ensure that [anti-terrorism measures] . . . [are] formulated with 
precision.”46   
Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 1456 stipulates that “states 
must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all 
their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures 
in accordance with international law, in particular international human 
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”47 According to Article 25 of the 
UN Charter, all members “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council.”48 
SCO contradicts UN Resolution 1456 by using the “Three Evils” 
doctrine to establish policies and take actions that blatantly violate 
fundamental and universal human rights. The violated rights include: 
humane treatment during deprivation of liberty; fair and public hearings; 
adequate time and facilities for preparation of a defense and 
communication with counsel; freedom from forced confession of guilt; 
appeal of convictions and sentences; freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; manifestation of religion; holding of opinions without 
interference; expression of information and ideas of all kinds through any 
media; peaceful assembly; association with others; electoral rights; 
freedom from religious discrimination; cultural, religious, and linguistic 
rights for minorities; freedom from genocide; freedom from torture; 
freedom from refoulement; and self-determination.49 Section IV provides 
detailed examples of SCO members’ violations of these rights. 
These are not just rights that the international community at large has 
deemed important; SCO members have legally bound themselves to 
protect and uphold these rights. These rights are contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 																																								 																					
43 Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, para. 33, 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Dec. 28, 2005) (by Martin Scheinin) 
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report]; see also S.C. Res. 1566, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 
(Oct. 8, 2004). 
44 Id. at para. 50. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 S.C. Res. 1456, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (italics added). 
48 U.N. Charter art. 25. 
49 See, respectively, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 10, 14.1, 14.3(b), 
14.3(g), 14.5, 18.1, 18.3, 19.1, 19.2, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention against Torture, 
supra note 6, arts. 2, 3; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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Convention on Genocide, the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), all of which are legally binding50 and which reiterate many of 
the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.51 
Each SCO member has signed and ratified these treaties, with one 
exception: China signed the ICCPR in 1998, but has yet to ratify it.52 
However, since China has acceded to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, it is still prohibited from acting in a way that would “defeat 
the object and purpose” of any treaty it has signed. 53 
To be fair, under the ICCPR and ICESCR, states can restrict freedom 
of movement and freedom of expression, but only when necessary for the 
protection of national security or public order.54 However, prohibitions 
on genocide, torture, and refoulement are so widespread, settled, and 
fundamental in international law as to constitute or border on jus cogens, 
which cannot be overridden by any exigency.55 
Thus, the “Three Evils” doctrine poses serious legal difficulties for 
SCO members in light of their human rights treaty obligations. In 
particular, by stretching the consensus definition of terrorism beyond its 
breaking point, this doctrine allows SCO members to target even 
peaceful dissidents and run roughshod over their fundamental rights. 
This, however, is not unintentional but rather wholly congruent with 
SCO’s stated aim to usher in a new international order, one in which it 
sees itself as the “pioneer organization” dealing with international 
terrorism.56  
 
B. Reciprocal Recognition under the “Concept of Cooperation” 
 
Compounding the problems of the “Three Evils” doctrine, SCO 
states agreed in 2005 to the “Concept of Cooperation,” which provides 
that member states will harmonize domestic legislation to ensure 
“reciprocal recognition of a terrorist, separatist, or extremist act 
regardless of whether legislation of SCO member states includes a 
corresponding act in the same category of crimes or whether the act is 
																																								 																					
50  Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/convinfofaq.htm (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2014).  
51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
52 ICCPR, supra note 49. The ICCPR was ratified by Russia (1973), Uzbekistan (1995), 
Kyrgyzstan (1994), Tajikistan (1999), and Kazakhstan (2006); China signed in 1998. Id. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. China 
ratified on Sept. 3, 1997. Id. 
54 ICCPR, supra note 49, at arts. 8(c), 12.3, 13, 19.3(b), 21, 22.2. Each of these allows for 
restrictions when necessary to protect national security or public order; however, 8(c), 21, and 22.2 
allow restrictions only in “democratic societ[ies].” Id. 
55  Jus Cogens Definition, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
56 History of Development of SCO, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2006 3:16 PM), available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020347.htm. 
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described using the very same terms.”57 Stated simply, the law of one 
member becomes the law of all members. Thus, an individual deemed a 
“Three Evils” suspect by China must be considered such by Tajikistan. 
A specific provision of the “Concept of Cooperation” provides one 
illustration of how the concept works. This provision declares that 
member states will “not provide asylum for individuals, accused or 
suspected of conducting terrorism, separatist, and extremist activity, and 
[will] extradite such individuals at respective requests on the part of 
another SCO member state.”58 Such reciprocity enables the prosecution 
and punishment of a vast array of dissent. For example, Tibetan monks 
who flee to India59 after being caught planning a self-immolation protest, 
could be extradited to China as terrorists under the extradition provision 
of the 2005 Declaration and under SCO’s definition of terrorism.60 Or, 
suppose that Karakalpak students peacefully demonstrate for expanded 
labor rights and then clash with Uzbek police following the police’s 
detonation of teargas. Under the “Concept of Cooperation,” those 
students could be prosecuted as extremists using Russia’s expansive anti-
extremism laws.  
Russia’s definition of extremism is particularly troublesome because 
it provides a list of twelve general activities rather than a clear, precise 
statement of characteristics.61  Included among these is the nebulous 
“stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord.”62 Under Section 
280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code, anyone who publicly calls for 
“extremist activity” can be imprisoned for up to three years.63 Using 
mass media to do so can increase the term to five years.64 Involvement in 
the activity of a public or religious association that has been deemed 
“extremist” by a court warrants imprisonment of two years.65 Particularly 
powerful is Article 282, which allows authorities to imprison anyone 
who publicly attempts to incite hatred or enmity or disparagement of a 
person.66  
Under SCO’s “Concept of Cooperation,” members must harmonize 
their domestic legislation regimes to ensure “reciprocal recognition” of 																																								 																					
57 Concept of Cooperation Between SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism, 
and Extremism, art. 3 June 5, 2005, available at 
http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-Whitepaper-AppendixA-
SCO-Docs.pdf.  
58 Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2006 3:15 PM), 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020345.htm.  
59 That is, once India joins SCO, an event which is expected to take place in 2015. Pax Sinica, 
supra note 27. 
60 See Li Decheng, Self-immolations Are Not Noble Behavior, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 2011, at 
8 (“Those that encourage monks and nuns to commit self-immolation are engaged in religious 
extremism and terrorism.”); see also Hua Zi, Extreme Acts of Violence, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 25, 
2011, at 8 (stating it is “terrorist behavior . . . to incite young Tibetans to commit suicide”). 
61 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE, FEDERAL LAW ON COMBATING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 7 
(2012) (unofficial translation provided by the Council of Europe) (reflecting amendments made in 
2008).  
62 Id. 
63  The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation art. 280.1, available at 
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7. 
64 Id. at art. 280(2). 
65 Id. at art. 282.2(2). 
66 Id. at art. 282(1).  
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other members’ characterizations of “Three Evils” acts even if their 
criminal codes do not include those acts or address them the same way. 
Thus, Russia’s formulation of “extremism” carries great import and, 
unsurprisingly, prompted the following statement by the UN Human 
Rights Committee in a 2009 report: 
 
[E]xtremism laws are being used to target organizations 
and individuals critical of the Government . . . . [T]he 
definition of ‘extremist activity’ in the [Russian] Federal 
Law on Combating Extremist Activity remains vague, 
allowing for arbitrariness in its application . . . . [T]he 
2006 amendment to this law has made certain forms of 
defamation of public officials an act of extremism.67 
 
The “Concept of Cooperation” also seriously compromises SCO 
members’ obligations under international law to refrain from refoulement 
and to respect individuals’ freedom of movement.68 With the exception 
of Uzbekistan, every SCO member has ratified the legally binding 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR).69 Article 33 of 
CRSR expressly prohibits refoulement: “No Contracting State shall expel 
or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”70  
In addition, every SCO member has ratified the Convention against 
Torture, Article 2 of which states: “Each State Party shall take effective 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” Article 3 states: “No State 
Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.” Furthermore, Article 16 prohibits 
“acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 71 Thus, 
the “Concept of Cooperation” poses problems for SCO members, given 
their legal obligation to each of these treaties. 
 
C. Secretive Blacklist Formulation and Opaque Information-Sharing 
Practices 
 
SCO’s lack of transparency makes it impossible to know whom it 
suspects of “Three Evils” activities and how such determinations are 
made. This is particularly troubling given the size of SCO’s blacklist. In 
2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human 																																								 																					
67 Human Rights Committee, Considerations Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of 
the Covenant, para. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2009). 
68 Convention against Torture, supra note 49, at art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 49, at art. 12; 
Refugee Convention, supra note 6. 
69 The Refugee Convention has been ratified by China (1982), Kazakhstan (1989), Kyrgyzstan 
(1996), Russia (1993), and Tajikistan (1993). Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Convention against Torture, supra note 49, at art. 2, 3, 16. 
SUMMER 2015 THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
172 
 
Rights, Martin Scheinin, stated that SCO’s terrorist blacklist, which is 
known to contain 1100 names, is twice the length of the UN’s terrorist 
list.72  
The SCO entity responsible for gathering and sharing information on 
“Three Evils” suspects is called the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 
(RATS). According to its executive director, RATS goes to whatever 
lengths necessary to gather information about organizations and 
individuals suspected of “Three Evils” activities.73 Such information is 
posted to a secret blacklist website. 74  RATS’ secrecy and lack of 
oversight and accountability create what Scheinin has called “an 
insurmountable wall against independent investigations into human 
rights violations.”75 
Under the legal framework of RATS, SCO states possess power to 
dispatch their agents to pursue suspects in consenting member states.76 
Furthermore, the secret service agency of any SCO state can request 
assistance from any other state’s secret services in gathering information 
and pursuing suspects.77 The requesting state need only provide the 
purpose of and the grounds for the request, as well as the type of 
assistance desired (e.g. interrogation, detention, or extradition).78 The 
responding state must then “take all necessary measures to ensure a 
prompt and complete execution of the request.” 79  The “means and 
supporting materials used” to fulfill the request “shall not be subject to 
disclosure.”80 
The opacity of this process has major ramifications for the due 
process of law. Simply put, the state receiving a request has no means to 
verify the quality, or even existence, of the evidence used by the 
requesting state to pursue a suspect. Likewise, the requesting state never 
knows the means used to fulfill its request.  
As a result, and as illustrated via case studies in Part IV, the opacity 
of the RATS framework threatens fundamental and universal human 
rights, including: freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; 
compensation for unlawful arrest; the presumption of innocence for those 
charged with crimes; freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with one’s privacy, family or unlawful attacks on one’s honor or 
reputation; freedom of association with others; prompt and detailed 																																								 																					
72  Human Rights in the North Caucasus: Hearing before the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
Commission, 115th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Martin Scheinin, U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Counterterrorism and Human Rights), available at 
http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/2011-hric-sco-whitepaper-full.pdf.  
73 SCO Anti-terror Agency Successful: Official, CHINA DAILY (June 13, 2006, 8:57 PM), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/13/eng20060613_273727.html. 
74 Id. 
75 Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 49, Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (Feb. 4, 2009).  
76 The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization art. 18, 
June 16, 2009. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at art. 14. 
79 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, supra note 40, 
art. 9.1 (2001). 
80 Id. at art. 11.4. 
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information about the nature and cause of the charges against oneself; 
and an effective remedy for violated rights.81 All of these rights are 
contained in the legally binding International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Thus, the secret and opaque nature of RATS’ 
blacklist and information-sharing practices bodes ill for fundamental 
human rights related to the due process of law. 
 
D. Adherence to the Principle of “Non-interference in Internal Affairs” 
 
The SCO Charter seeks to insulate members from human rights 
criticisms by stressing the principle of “non-interference in internal 
affairs.” 82  Explication of this core principle is found in the 2006 
Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, which states: 
 
Diversity of civilization and model of development must 
be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural 
traditions, political and social systems, values and model 
of development formed in the course of history should 
not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’ 
internal affairs. Model of social development should not 
be “exported.”83 
 
However, this declaration runs counter to expert opinion. In 2010, a 
group of UN human rights experts issued the following statement:  
 
No one may invoke cultural diversity as an excuse to 
infringe on human rights guaranteed by international law 
or limit their scope, nor should cultural diversity be 
taken to support segregation and harmful traditional 
practices which, in the name of culture, seek to sanctify 
differences that run counter to the universality, 
indivisibility and interdependence of human rights. 
. . . . 
We remind States of their responsibility under 
international law to create an environment conducive to 
cultural diversity and the enjoyment of cultural rights in 
which all persons, including national or ethnic, religious 
and linguistic minorities . . . have the right: to express 
																																								 																					
81 ICCPR, supra note 49, at arts. 2.3(a), 9.1, 9.5, 14.3(a), 14.2, 17.1, and 22.1. 
82  Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization art. 2, May 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69.  
83 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of SCO art. 3, CHINA DAILY, (June 15, 2006, 8:30 
PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/15/content_618177.htm. 
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themselves . . . [and] participate in the cultural life of 
their choice.84 
 
While SCO’s core principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” 
is well supported by the fundamental international law of sovereign 
equality, upon which the UN is based,85 sovereign equality is itself based 
on the universal right to self-determination. That is, before a nation can 
exist, with all of its guarantees of sovereignty and equality within the 
community of nations, it is first a people—a people with an absolute 
right to self-determination, which is to say the right to be free from 
oppression and to pursue their own development, even to build their own 
nation if such development is denied by their current government. 
Thus, international law holds that a sovereign state that represents all 
of its peoples “on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and 
respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal 
arrangements, is entitled to the protection of international law of its 
territorial integrity.” 86 Conversely, a state that denies internal people(s)87 
“meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, 
cultural and social development” forfeits its sovereign authority. 88  
The universal right to self-determination is so well established in 
international law it “has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’ and is 
considered a general principle of international law.”89 It appears in 
Article 1 of the UN Charter,90 Article 1 of the ICESCR, and Article 1 of 
ICCPR, the latter two of which read: “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”91 Every SCO state is party to each of these covenants.  
Certainly not every separatist movement possesses a lawful claim to 
self-determination. However, SCO’s doctrines enable its members to 
engage in practices that deny internal minorities their basic human right 
to “meaningful access to government to pursue political, economic, 
culture and social development.”92  																																								 																					
84 Statement by a Group of United Nations Experts on the World Day for Cultural Diversity for 
Dialogue and Development, “Human Rights are Essential Tools for an Effective Intercultural 
Dialogue,” May 21, 2010, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/cultural_rights/docs/statements/Statement_cultural_diversity2
1052010.doc.  
85 U.N. Charter art. 2.1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all its Members.”). 
86 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), paras. 128, 154.  
87 A definition of a minority people provided by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities includes “a group 
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose 
members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” Minorities under 
International Law, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
88 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 86, at para. 138. 
89 Id. at para. 114.  
90 U.N. Charter art. 1.2. 
91 ICESCR, supra note 49, art 1; ICCPR, supra note 49, art 1. 
92 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 86. 
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The 2014 Freedom in the World report, published by the non-
governmental organization Freedom House, provides some perspective 
on the degree of self-determination possible for peoples within SCO 
countries. SCO country scores are listed in the following table (1 = best 
score possible; 7 = worst score possible):93 
 
             Political Rights94          Civil Liberties95     Status96 
China97                   7        6.5    Not Free 
Kazakhstan98          6         5    Not Free 
Kyrgyzstan99          5           5    Partly Free 
Russia100            6                     5    Not Free 
Tajikistan101           6         6    Not Free 
Uzbekistan102         7         7    Not Free 
 
This table is meant to provide only a quantitative snapshot. Detailed, 
documented reports analyzing each SCO member’s performance on 
human rights can be found at the U.S. Department of State website 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013.103 
Thus, SCO invokes the principle of “non-interference in internal 
affairs” to deflect international criticism of SCO members’ practices that 
violate internal minorities’ rights to self-determination. Part IV(B) below 
presents a case study that specifically illustrates the conflict between the 
SCO doctrines and an internal people’s right to self-determination. 
 																																								 																					
93  See Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology#.VGh4q2x0yM9 (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015) (explaining that the scores are based on analysis of more than 140 different 
questions). 
94 Id. (explaining that the “Political Rights” score is comprised of analysis of the country’s 
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning government).  
95 Id. (explaining that the “Civil Liberties” score is comprised of analysis of the country’s 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights). 
96 Id. (explaining that the “Status” rating is an average of the “Political Rights” and “Civil 
Liberties” scores, wherein 5.5 to 7.0 = Not Free; 3.0 to 5.0 = Partly Free; and 1.0 to 2.5 = Free). 
97  Freedom in the World 2014 China, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/china-0#.VGh40Gx0yM8 (last visited Mar. 6, 
2015). 
98  Freedom in the World 2014 Kazakhstan, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/kazakhstan-0#.VGh5wGx0yM8 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015). 
99  Freedom in the World 2014 Kyrgyzstan, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/kyrgyzstan-0#.VGh51Gx0yM8 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015). 
100  Freedom in the World 2014 Russia, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/russia-0#.VGh6OWx0yM8 (last visited Mar. 6, 
2015). 
101  Freedom in the World 2014 Tajikistan, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tajikistan-0#.VGh4omx0yM9 (last visited Mar. 
6, 2015). 
102  Freedom in the World 2014 Uzbekistan, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/uzbekistan-0#.VGh54Gx0yM8 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2015). 
103  See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, STATE.GOV, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (last visited Jun. 10, 
2015). 
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IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SCO OBLIGATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
The case studies in this Part and in Part I of this Comment were 
chosen because, collectively, they involve each SCO state and each core 
SCO doctrine discussed in Part III. Moreover, collectively, they elucidate 
the conflict between SCO’s core doctrines and SCO members’ binding 
obligations to fundamental international laws. 
 
A. Russia’s Illegal Extradition of Makhmadruzi Iskandarov to	Tajikistan	
 
In October 2005, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan sentenced 
Makhmadruzi Iskandarov, head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan 
(DPT), to twenty-three years in prison.104 Iskandarov had left Tajikistan 
eighteen months prior and established residence in Russia. 105  After 
Iskandarov left, Tajik authorities sought to tie him to an illegal armed 
organization, issued a warrant for his arrest, and aggressively pressed 
Russian authorities for his extradition.106 Accusations against him ranged 
from terrorism, attempted murder, and illegal arms possession, to abuse 
of office and theft of state funds.107 Iskandarov, a former state utility 
executive who planned to run for president in 2005, was highly critical of 
President Rakhmonov, who has ruled Tajikistan continuously since 1994. 
Iskandarov’s DPT had called for free and transparent elections.108 
In response to Tajikistan’s request, Russian authorities detained 
Iskandarov in December 2004, but released him after claiming 
insufficient evidence for extradition.109 They detained him again in April 
2005 after intense lobbying from Tajik authorities, who wanted to charge 
him with attempting a coup d’état. 110  Again, however, Russian 
authorities claimed insufficient evidence for extradition and freed him in 
Moscow.111  
Importantly, Iskandarov had appealed to Russian authorities for 
refugee status.112  Russia (as well as Tajikistan) is party to the UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,113 which prohibits the 
return of “a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 																																								 																					
104 Tajik Court Sentences Iskandarov to 23 Years, MOSCOW TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/paid/2005/10/article/tajik-court-sentences-iskandarov-to-
23-years/209458.html. 
105 Tajik Democratic Party Leader-Terrorist or Simple Criminal, SPUTNIK NEWS (Nov. 12, 
2004, 6:46 PM), http://en.ria.ru/onlinenews/20041211/39775461.html?id. 
106 Id. 
107 Tajik Court Sentences Iskandarov to 23 Years, supra note 104. 
108 Tajik Democratic Party Leader-Terrorist or Simple Criminal, supra note 105. 
109 ‘Missing’ Tajik Opposition Leader Reportedly Arrested, RADIO FREE EUROPE (April 26, 
2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058646.html. 
110 Arkady Dubnov, Tajik Opposition Leader Makhmadruzi Iskandarov Became a Political 
Refugee in Russia, FERGHANA NEWS (April 14, 2005, 3:14 PM), 
http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=911. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113  Refugee Convention, supra note 6. See also Danielle J. Grigsby, The Silent Plague: 
Refoulement in the Russian Federation, 1 OXFORD MONITOR OF FORCED MIGRATION 33, 
http://oxmofm.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/OxMo-vol-1-no-2-07-GRIGSBY.pdf. 
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his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”114 Upon Iskandarov’s release in Moscow, Russia’s 
Directorate of Information Vasily Glushenko stated, “No person 
applying for the status of a refugee can be extradited from Russia before 
the decision on the appeal is made.”115 The next day, however, a group of 
men seized Iskandarov in Moscow without presenting identification, an 
arrest warrant, or a judicial order of any kind.116 They spirited him to a 
bathhouse where he was beaten,117 and though he requested a lawyer, his 
request was denied.118 The next day he was taken to a forest where his 
face was covered with a mask, and the following morning he was flown 
to Tajikistan where he was placed in a Dushanbe prison to await his 
trial.119 While in prison, Iskandarov suffered abuse and had only limited 
access to his family and lawyers.120  
In July 2005, three months before Iskandarov’s trial, SCO leaders 
gathered in Astana to sign the Declaration of the Heads of Members 
States of the SCO.121 According to this agreement, SCO member states 
will “not provide asylum for individuals, accused or suspected of 
conducting terrorism, separatist, and extremist activity, and [will] 
extradite such individuals at respective requests on the part of another 
SCO member state.”122  
Thus, this agreement does not require evidence of terrorist, 
separatist, or extremist activity—only an accusation of such—for 
extradition to take place. Nor does it require the extraditing state to 
consider whether the suspect might be tortured upon return to the 
requesting state. Thus, this SCO agreement conflicts with Article 3 of the 
UN Convention against Torture, which both Russia and Tajikistan have 
ratified. Article 3 prohibits the extradition of an individual “where there 
are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”123 
Iskandarov stated that he was indeed tortured, as well as drugged and 
subjected to electric shocks after refoulement to Dushanbe.124 Following 
Iskandarov’s trial, Tajik officials allegedly denied him access to his 
family and lawyers for at least eight months, and he remained in the pre-
trial detention facility instead of a prison camp until February 2007, 
about three months after President Rakhmonov’s reelection. 125 
Incidentally, Rakhmonov won more than seventy-nine percent of the 
																																								 																					
114 Refugee Convention, supra note 6 (emphasis added). 
115 Dubnov, supra note 110. 
116 Iskandarov v. Tajikistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 39/2006, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/Add.1 at 18 (2007). 
117 Iskandarov v. Russia, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 28 (2010).  
118 Id. 
119 Id. at paras. 30, 33. 
120 U.S. ‘Concerned’ over Tajik Opposition Leader’s Jailing, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Oct. 7, 
2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061960.html. 
121 Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, supra note 58. 
122 Id. at para. 3. 
123 Convention against Torture, supra note 6. 
124 Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 92. See also id. at paras. 88, 89, 94. 
125 Id. at paras. 88, 90, 92; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: TAJIKISTAN (2007). 
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vote.126 OSCE, which was invited to observe the process, reported that 
the election lacked “a genuine choice and meaningful pluralism, and 
revealed substantial shortcomings,” including the absence of “a 
framework for democratic elections,” widespread multiple voting, and a 
failure to follow counting procedures.127 
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled in 2010 
that Russia’s abduction and unacknowledged detention of Iskandarov 
“constituted a complete negation of the right to liberty and security of 
person,” in violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to which Russia is party.128 It also unanimously concluded that 
Russia’s failure “to protect him against risks of ill-treatment” violated 
Article 3, which states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 129  The court cited 
reports indicating that torture of detainees by Tajik authorities was 
common and, thus, foreseeable.130 
Thus, while Russia’s refoulement of Iskandarov to Tajikistan 
flagrantly violated the European Convention on Human Rights, the U.N. 
Convention against Torture, and the UN Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, it fully comports with SCO’s “Concept of 
Cooperation,” as outlined above in Part III(B), which requires the on-
demand extradition of anyone even suspected of the “Three Evils.” 
 
B. Chinese National Security Interests vs. Uyghurs’ Right to Self-
Determination 
 
On July 5, 2009, hundreds of ethnic Uyghurs took to the streets of 
Urumqi, the capital of and largest city in Xinjiang, China’s western-most 
province. 131  Their peaceful protest of Chinese officials’ failure to 
investigate the deaths of migrant Uyghurs in a factory fight in 
Guangdong the prior month turned into a clash with ethnic Han and 
further escalated as Chinese police confronted demonstrators with tear 
gas.132 The conflict injured 1,700 and left 200 dead, including three Han 
and one police officer.133 
																																								 																					
126  Tajik President Wins Third Term, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2006, 3:59 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6119752.stm. 
127  OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (OSCE), ORGANIZATION 
FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, PRELIMINARY, REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 6 NOVEMBER 2006 1, 2, 8–9 (Apr. 18, 2007).  
128 Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 150. 
129 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, 
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
130 Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 87–88, 92. 
131 Edward Wong, Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at 
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html?_r=0. 
132 Edward Wong, China Locks Down Restive Region after Deadly Clashes, N.Y. TIMES, July 
7, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07china.html?pagewanted=all. 
133 Feature: Urumqi Licks Its Wounds on Riot Anniversary, PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 5, 2014, 
3:22 PM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0705/c90882-8751421.html; Wong, supra note 
131. 
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Uyghurs, who are mostly Muslim and speak Turkish, make up forty-
six percent of Xinjiang’s twenty-two million people.134 However, they 
comprise just thirteen percent of Urumqi’s 2.4 million people, and less 
than one percent of China’s total citizenry; though, at ten million, they 
exceed the population of many countries, e.g., Tajikistan and Austria.135 
Han Chinese, on the other hand, constitute ninety-two percent of China’s 
population, including thirty-nine percent of Xinjiang and seventy-three 
percent of the city of Urumqi.136 
Uyghurs consistently invoke the universal right to self-
determination, as well as the freedom of religion, freedom of expression, 
and freedom from discrimination to justify their protests of Chinese 
oppression.137 SCO and China, on the other hand, cite the “Three Evils” 
doctrine and the principle of “Non-interference in Internal Affairs” to 
justify the oppressive measures employed by Chinese authorities.138 
Disturbingly, they make little attempt to distinguish between violent and 
peaceful dissidents.139  
The riots in Urumqi illustrate Uyghur desperation born of long-
standing and increasing Chinese repression. The territory of Xinjiang, 
which literally means “new borders” in Chinese, was officially annexed 
as a province by the Qing dynasty in the late nineteenth century.140 In 
their 1931 draft constitution, Chinese Communist leaders promised the 
Uyghurs independence,141 and even up until the end of World War II 
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Mao still favored self-determination.142 By 1947, however, that policy 
had changed to “national regional autonomy.”143  
Today, Xinjiang, which is China’s largest province in terms of both 
landmass and oil and gas reserves, is too valuable to part with.144 As a 
result, Uyghurs have no political voice in Xinjiang’s future, and though 
they enjoy a plurality of its population, they possess relatively scant 
representation in positions of industry and government, which are 
dominated by Han Chinese.145 
In addition to a lack of meaningful access to government, Uyghurs 
are subject to religiously, linguistically, culturally, and ethnically dilutive 
policies that collectively constitute not only discrimination but, arguably, 
constructive genocide. The legal definition of genocide includes the 
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group . . . [by] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part; 
[or] imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”146 
The following are only a few examples of Chinese attempts to do exactly 
that.  
In September 2014, Chinese officials in Urumqi began offering 
rewards “to people who report the illegal production and sale of face-
covering gowns and clothing that represent religious extremism.”147  
In May 2014, following some sixty years of large-scale migration of 
Han Chinese into Xinjiang,148 Chinese president Xi Jinping called for the 
relocation of Uyghurs to other parts of China for education and work, 
emphasizing the need for Chinese ethnic minorities to develop “correct 
views about the motherland,” and its greatness.149 At the same time, Xi 
pushed for intensified Mandarin education for Turkish-speaking 
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Uyghurs, 150  and the bestowal of cash, health care, and educational 
benefits on Han Chinese who intermarry with Uyghurs.151 
In addition, China has stepped up its “Strike Hard” campaign, which 
relies on the “Three Evils” doctrine, employing closed-circuit cameras, 
regular identification checks, and even examinations of cellphone 
playlists to ferret out Uyghur extremists and terrorists.152  China has 
encouraged fellow SCO members to follow suit.153  
In August 2014, the Xinjiang city of Karamay banned those wearing 
long beards, headscarves, veils, jilbabs, or clothing with Muslim symbols 
from using public transportation.154 In November, officials in Urumqi 
arrested several people for “illegal preaching” and other activities under 
religious extremism laws. 155  Kashgar’s mayor applauded the prison 
sentences, which ranged from five to sixteen years, saying religious 
extremism had “seriously affected people’s thoughts.”156 Furthermore, 
during Ramadan, Chinese authorities forbid Muslim civil servants from 
fasting. 157  The list goes on. Such a patent denial of internal self-
determination lends legal credence to Uyghur calls for independence.  
Unsurprisingly, the Uyghur population has resisted these measures. 
At the end of Ramadan, the government-appointed imam of China’s 
largest mosque was stabbed to death. 158  Uyghur terrorism against 
symbols of government has escalated in parallel with China’s “Strike 
Hard” campaign. Such terrorist acts include an attack on a Xinjiang 
police station,159 bomb and knife attacks at the Urumqi train station,160 
the stabbing to death of twenty-nine people by masked, knife-wielding 
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assailants at the Kunming train station,161 and the bombing of a morning 
market in Urumqi.162 Again, the list goes on. 
It may be difficult to say whether the current Chinese oppression is 
the chicken or the egg. Regardless, such oppression does appear to 
galvanize the Uyghurs’ separatist movement.163 And, without a vote and 
without the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, 
religion, movement, privacy, as well as freedoms from ethnic 
discrimination and genocide, they have little left to lose. 
 
C. Kazakhstan’s Refoulement of Ershidin Israil 
 
In late September of 2009 Ershidin Israil, a 38-year-old geography 
teacher traveled four nights on foot to escape from his native Chinese 
province of Xinjiang to Almaty, Kazakhstan.164 Days earlier, he and two 
other men had given an interview to Radio Free Asia about the Chinese 
government’s crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs following the July protests 
in Urumqi.165 Specifically, Israil had divulged details of the September 
18 torture death of Shohret Tursun at the hands of Chinese authorities, 
who had been holding the young ethnic Uyghur and some forty other 
men since the July riots.166 
The day after the interview, Chinese authorities detained the other 
two men on suspicion of “leaking state secrets,” and sought to arrest 
Israil as well.167 Israil, who years earlier served a six-year sentence for 
“acts of separatism,” fled, fearing severe punishment.168 
Once in Kazakhstan, Israil applied for asylum with Kazakh 
authorities and for refugee status with the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).169 In March 2010, UNHCR granted his request and 																																								 																					
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secured a resettlement offer from Sweden.170 Days before Israil’s April 1 
departure date, however, Kazakh authorities received an extradition 
request from China on grounds of terrorism.171 Kazakhstan denied Israil 
an exit visa, citing his appearance on an Interpol terrorism watch list, 
which had been arranged by China.172,173  
On April 3, Kazakh authorities moved Israil into a “safe place.”174 
Less than three months later they arrested him on terrorism charges, and 
over the next eleven months Kazakh courts denied his application for 
asylum five times.175 On May 3, 2011, UNHCR revoked his refugee 
status, and on May 30, 2011, Israil was forcibly extradited to China as a 
“major terrorist suspect.”176 
The UNHCR refused to disclose its reasons for revoking Israil’s 
refugee status, citing confidentiality. However, the World Uyghur 
Congress received information from a UNHCR contact who stated that 
Kazakh authorities had informed the UNHCR that Israil had been sent by 
Chinese authorities to spy on Almaty’s Uyghur population, which 
numbers nearly a quarter-of-a-million.177 To date, Israil’s whereabouts 
are unknown. China’s last statement came in October 2011 in response to 
an inquiry from the Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights. 178  It stated that Israil “was extradited to China in strict 
observance by both parties of the extradition treaty between China and 
Kazakhstan. Mr. Ershidin has now fully confessed to having carried out 
violent illegal terrorist activities and his case is currently being further 
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adjudicated.”179, 180 Article 113 of the Chinese Criminal Code stipulates 
that crimes that endanger national security are punishable by death.181 
Shortly after Israil’s extradition, Kazakhstan extradited 28 Muslim 
men to Uzbekistan, which the men had left more than a year before due 
to religious persecution.182 Their extraditions, along with Israil’s, took 
place just days before Kazakhstan hosted the SCO’s ten-year “Jubilee 
Summit” in Astana.183  
The pressured extradition of those fleeing religious persecution is not 
simply an unhappy side effect of SCO policies; it is an integral part of 
the organization’s “Concept of Cooperation.”  
Kazakhstan’s extraditions in the run-up to the SCO summit 
demonstrate SCO members’ intent to transform the international order 
via SCO policies and principles. At the summit, the organization released 
a declaration that stated as much, reading in part: “The member states 
underline . . . the aim of formulating a comprehensive approach to the 
issue of reforming the U.N. and its Security Council . . . .”184 
The extraditions even violated Kazakhstan’s own law, which had 
been amended just six months earlier to read: “Extradition is not allowed 
. . . [if] there is a reason to believe that a person may be subjected to 
torture in the requesting state.”185 Such wording mirrors Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture, which Kazakhstan ratified in 1998.186 
Two weeks after Kazakhstan’s extradition of Israil to China, the 
China Development Bank agreed to extend a $1.5 billion loan to Kazak 
mining behemoth Kazkhmys. 187  The timing of the two events was 
perhaps more than coincidental. China wanted Israil, and Kazakhstan 
wanted the loan. China is Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner,188 and the 
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Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline carries up to twenty million metric tons 
per year.189 
This case typifies the way in which the application of the “Three 
Evils” and the “Concept of Cooperation” can lead to violations of 
fundamental human rights that SCO members have previously endorsed 
via ratification of legally binding conventions. Such rights, which are 
addressed in Part III of this Comment, include: association with others; 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the holding of opinions 
without interference; expression of information and ideas of all kinds 
through any media; freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
one’s privacy and family; the presumption of innocence for those 
charged with crimes; non-refoulement; a fair and public hearing; 
adequate time and facilities for preparation of defense and 
communication with counsel; freedom from forced confession of guilt; 
appeal of convictions and sentences; and effective remedy for violated 
rights. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
All too often, the ratification of human rights treaties is an easy 
choice for authoritarian regimes. For one thing, it yields praise and 
reduces pressure from other states and organizations. For another, failure 
to comply with such treaties, even those concerning the most 
fundamental of human rights, seldom results in penalties.190 Given this, it 
is no surprise that the ratification of human rights treaties by repressive 
regimes “is associated with a worsening of human rights.”191  
This evidence, along with the proliferation of terrorism and national 
security concerns, highlights the increasingly precarious position of 
human rights within the international legal system. Now more than ever, 
the formulation and execution of security policies requires careful 
consideration of human rights. Yet, SCO’s “Three Evils” doctrine, 
“Concept of Cooperation,” secret blacklist and information-sharing 
practices, and adherence to the principle of “non-interference in internal 
affairs” subvert, and even supplant, human rights conventions, customary 
law, general principles, and expert opinions which have taken hold as 
international law only through many painful lessons and decades of hard 
work. 
Thus, SCO’s expanding membership portends a transformation of 
the international legal system from one in which universal human rights 
play a fundamental, guiding role to one in which authoritarianism is the 
controlling principle.  
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